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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
AUGUST SCHRIEBER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7737 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial 
District Court granting a petition made by Brigham E. 
Roberts, District Attorney for the Third Judicial District, 
to vacate and set aside an order of dismissal and discharge 
in the case of State of Utah v. August Schrieber. The facts 
essential to this appeal are as follows: 
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The appellant, defendant below, a duly licensed and 
registered naturopathic physician and surgeon in the State 
of Utah, was on the 18th day of March, 1949, found guilty 
by a jury of the crime of abortion (R. 40). On May 14, 
1949, defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Charles 
G. Cowley, sitting in the Third Judicial District Court, 
to serve an indeterminate term of not less than two nor 
more than ten years in the Utah State Prison. On the 
same day Judge Cowley suspended sentence upon defendant 
and placed defendant on probation under the custody of 
the Adult Probation and Parole Department of the State 
of Utah (R. 54). Subsequent to May 14, 1949, as a result 
of the trial of said action, the defendant became seriously 
ill, having what is known to the medical profession as 
acute paroxysmal tachycardia, which is a disease caused 
by extreme emotional stress. 
During the period from May 14, 1949, to October 20, 
1949, defendant suffered two heart attacks and his con-
dition grew increasingly worse; he was unable to work 
regularly and during a large part of said time was confined 
to bed. Defendant was advised by his doctor, Dr. William 
Henning, that there was a possibility of his health improv-
ing by going to a place with a lower altitude. At that time 
defendant's six-year old son, Paul A. Schrieber, was also in 
poor health, having an excessive number of white cor-
puscles in his blood for a boy of that age. Defendant be-
lieved that a change of climate would also benefit the health 
of his son. During the period of his probation defendant 
had completely and fully complied with the conditions of 
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his probation and had conducted himself in a lawful and 
creditable manner. He had resumed his practice to the 
extent his poor health permitted. 
In October, 1949, defendant made application through 
his attorney Herbert B. Maw to the Third Judicial District 
Court for an order setting aside his conviction, dismissing 
the action and discharging him from custody. The motion 
described the physical condition of the defendant and his 
son and stated that his purpose for desiring to be discharged 
from custody was to allow him to go to Florida with his 
family for purposes of his health. The motion was accom-
panied by a report of the Adult Probation and Parole De-
partment of the State of Utah, signed by its probation offi-
cer, stating that the defendant had completely and fully 
complied with the conditions of his probation and had con-
ducted himself in a lawful and creditable manner and that 
the department would support whatever action the court 
felt justified in taking regarding setting aside of defend-
ant's conviction. The court, the Honorable Ray Van Cott, 
Jr., discussed the motion on several occasions with the de-
fendant's attorney, Herbert B. Maw. Defendant was not 
present at any discussion except for the hearing on the 
motion on October 20, 1949. 
On October 20, 1949, the court heard the evidence in 
support of defendant's motion, and made and entered its 
order setting aside the conviction, dismissing the case and 
discharging the defendant (R. 63, 64). The written order 
provided as follows : 
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"IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
"STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AUGUST SCHRIEBER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 
13255 
"WHEREAS, the Adult Probation and Parole 
Department of the State of Utah, which has charge 
of the above-named defendant, August Schrieber, 
has represented to the Court that said defendant has 
complied with all of the conditions of his probation 
since his conviction on March 18, 1949, and has in-
dicated to the Court its concurrence in the action 
herein taken and indicated by the attached report 
and, 
"Whereas, it appears to the Court that the said 
defendant has very poor health, having recently suf-
fered from two severe heart attacks which reduced 
his blood pressure from a normal of 140 to 92 and 
increased .his heart beats from a normal 72 to 126 
and, 
"Whereas, it appears that the defendant's six 
year old son, Paul A. Schrieber, has poor health be-
cause of an excessive number of white corpuscles in 
his blood, numbering about 13,600 while a normal 
count for a boy his age is about 7,500 and, 
"Whereas, it seems apparent that both the de-
fendant and his son must move to a warmer climate 
and a lower altitude if they are to enjoy a restora-
tion of their health and, 
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"Whereas, the defendant is a duly licensed and 
registered naturopathic physician and surgeon not 
only in the State of Utah but also in the States of 
South Carolina and Florida and is anxious to perma-
nently leave the State of Utah for the purpose of 
taking up residence and carrying on his profession 
in the State of Florida, a State which has the alti-
tude and climate essential to the health of defendant 
and his son and, 
"Whereas, it is the opinion of the Court that it 
will be compatible with the public interest if said 
defendant is permitted to move to the State of Flor-
ida and carry on his profession in that State, now 
therefore, 
"IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED that the conviction.of the defendant, August 
Schrieber, in the above-entitled case be ~et aside and 
that the said action against said defendant be dis-
missed and that said defendant be discharged from 
further supervision of the Parole Department of the 
State of Utah. 
"Dated the 20th day of October, 1949. 
BY THE COURT: 
jsj RAY VAN COTT, 
JUDGE." 
There is some disagreement as to the meaning of that 
order and the circumstances and representations leading 
up to it. It appears that defendant intended to go to Flor-
ida and remain there indefinitely depending upon whether 
there was an improvement in his health. He believed that 
he could resume his medical practice there. The court, the 
Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., had the impression that de-
fendant intended and agreed to permanently depart from 
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and remain outside of the State of Utah, despite the con-
dition of his health; such a condition if it existed was not, 
however, included in either the written order of October 
20, 1949 nor the minute order of that date. There is noth-
ing to indicate that defendant's purpose in leaving was 
intended to be made a mandatory condition of the order. 
Pursuant to the October 20, 1949 order defendant managed 
to close the practice he had attempted to carry while ill 
prior to the order ; he had closed his office, stored his 
equipment, and packed his furniture, all within less than 
two weeks. Communications were had with a man in Flor-
ida for procuring an apartment. 
Defendant's health took a turn for the worse, however, 
and from October 20, 1949 until around December 6, 1949 
the greatest part of defendant's time was spent confined 
to bed under the care of Dr. Henning. As soon as his health 
permitted defendant left, with his family, for Florida. That 
was on or about the 9th day of December, 1949 (R. 84). 
In the fall of 1950 defendant's health was still poor. 
During his eight-month stay in Florida he had been un-
able to work, and the greatest part of that stay was spent 
by him in the hospital. His condition was in fact worse 
than it had been in Utah. He decided to go to California 
for treatments. On his way to California in November, 
1950, defendant stopped over in Salt Lake City. On the 
advice of his attorney he went to see the Honorable Albert 
H. Ellett, presiding judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court and the judge of the Criminal Division of said court. 
His purpose in seeing the Judge was to determine the ex-
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act meaning and status of the order of October 20, 1949. 
Judge Ellett recounted the occasion of defendant's visit 
and inquiry as follows : ( R. 80-86.) 
"The Doctor came in my office and told me he 
could not longer live in Florida and was going to 
California, and asked if he was in violation of the 
order or law in passing through Utah. 
"At that time I told him the case had been dis-
missed, he was a free man, he could pass through 
Utah as often as he wanted to, and stay in Utah as 
long as he wanted to-there was no order of the 
court to prohibit it" (R. 103, 104). 
Defendant went on with his family to California to see 
if the climate and treatments would improve his health. 
He was sick all the time he was in California. Early in 
1951 defendant returned to the State of Utah with his 
family. Defendant's health had not improved in Florida 
and both defendant and his wife were anxious to remain 
in Utah. His wife was a Utah girl by birth, having sisters 
and an aged mother and father in the Salt Lake area. It 
was her desire to be close to her family in the event that 
anything happened to defendant. 
From the time of his return in January, 1951, defend-
ant's health showed a gradual improvement and it was 
defendant's intention to resume his practice in the event 
that his recovery continued. 
On May 29, 1951, Brigham E. Roberts, District Attor-
ney for the Third Judicial District Court, filed a petition 
with the court to vacate and set aside the order of October 
20, 1949, on the ground that the defendant had returned 
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to Utah in violation of a condition of the order of dismissal 
and on the further ground that said order made pursuant 
to Section 105-36-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended 
by Chapter 24, Laws of 1943, was in conflict with Article 
VII, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution (R. 57, 58). De-
fendant answered said petition denying that he was in 
violation of the said order, denying that said order violated 
Article VII, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and af-
firmatively alleging that the petition or order to show 
cause issued pursuant thereto violated the 5th Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States so placing defend-
ant in double jeopardy and that the order of October 20, 
1949 was final and absolute and divested the court of jur-
isdiction over defendant (R. 72, 73). The matter was set 
down for hearing for June 9, 1951. At that time the de-
fendant appeared with his attorneys Grant ~Iacfarlane and 
Herbert B. Maw. The District Attorney for the Third 
Judicial District, Brigham E. Roberts, appeared for the 
State of Utah and offered as his sole and only witnesses 
the defendant, August Schrieber and Herbert B. Maw. De-
fendant offered, in addition to himself, the following wit-
nesses: LeV on Schrieber, his wife, Dr. William Henning 
and Judge A. H. Ellett. In addition to the foregoing there 
was offered and received in evidence a record of the pro-
ceedings leading up to and including the order of October 
20, 1949. The court, by the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., 
having heard and considered the evidence, made his order 
setting aside and revoking the order of October 20, 1949 
and placing the defendant in the custody of the State Adult 
Probation and Parole Department (R. 74). The pertinent 
provisions of the court's opinion are as follows: 
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"Mr. Macfarlane, I am of the opinion that the 
act under which I took proceedings is constitutional. 
I am not disturbed about that. But I have been for 
a long time, since shortly after the granting of this 
order, I have been of the opinion that I was misled, 
I was imposed upon, and a fraud and deceit practiced 
upon me by the defendant, and I think that is shown 
by the fact that after he got the order that there was 
no intention to move from the State of Utah. And 
it was only when the whip that I used through Mr. 
Maw, his attorney, by making threat I would take 
action then that I propose to take now, that he even 
left the State of Utah (R. 107, 108). 
* * * * * 
"I want to say, with reference to the District 
Attorney and Probation Department, they have no 
responsibility in the granting of this order. 
"I have heretofore stated in reference to parties 
who asked me in reference to the matter, the obliga-
tion was solely mine, and I took it upon the fact I 
thought I was doing the right thing, and I wasn't of 
the opinion it would be a popular idea in taking the 
action I did,-it would probably be an unpopular 
idea. 
"I don't believe the defendant ever did intend 
to leave, and I am of the opinion that that court that 
grants an order, and revokes a conviction and sets 
it aside, upon fraud and deceit or misrepresentation 
by a defendant, who has no intention to comply with 
it, we are not divested of our authority in that re-
gard (R. 108, 109). 
* * * * * 
"And everyone here today admits the reason 
the order was signed was Dr. Schrieber had poor 
health and had to leave the State of Utah, and he 
had, with me, understood it would be permanent, he 
was not coming back here to live, and practice, or 
do otherwise (R. 110). 
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* * * * * 
"While it isn't called fraud, it all goes back to 
the fact of what was the understanding, what has 
been the compliance with that understanding, that is 
my language, Mr. Macfarlane, when I used the words 
'fraud and deceit' at the beginning of it, it shows 
no intention of good faith, there was never any in-
tention right at the inception of the order, , there 
was a violation, Dr. Schrieber was on his feet the 
20th of October, 1949, and, from all I could tell, 
· looked the same as he did today, and the other man 
-the doctor testified today, the other man was here 
in court, and all this illness occurred sometime after 
the order of the court was granted (R. 111, 112). 
* * * * * 
"Mr. Macfarlane, that order isn't letter perfect. 
There wasn't an understanding when he would leave, 
that is what the law would imply, no date was fixed 
when he should leave. 
"The matter dragged on to the latter part of 
October, all of November, and reports came to me, 
by various people, the man was purported to be in 
Salt Lake, and I would convey that to Governor 
Maw, and he said, 'I will see Dr. Schrieber'. And 
finally, I said to Governor Maw, 'This man isn't 
leaving, and I am getting doubts about this matter' 
(R. 112). 
* * * * * 
"Governor Maw, the reports I got during that 
period of October, November and December, came 
to me, I would say not from enemies of Dr. Schrieber, 
but by officials of this State, and those persons I 
am sure would not have any occasion to go to Dr. 
Schrieber's home, and if he saw Dr. Schrieber it 
would be on the street. I know the man, and I am 
positive-he is here in the court-room-1 am prac-
tically sure he would never have any occasion to go 
to Dr. Schrieber's home, whether he got his infor-
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mation directly by having seen him, or having some-
one tell him, I don't know which-but he was an 
official of the State, and reported that to me. I have 
never had a private citizen call me with reference 
to this matter" (R. 114). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURIS-
DICTION TO VACATE THE ORDER OF OC-
TOBER 20, 1949, THAT BEING A FINAL, UN-
CONDITIONAL AND VALID ORDER. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION UPON 
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT VACATED THE 
ORDER OF OCTOBER 20, 1949, IS IMMATER-
IAL AND IRRELEVANT AND DOES NOT CON-
STITUTE GOOD AND SUFFICIENT GROUNDS 
FOR REVOCATION. 
III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS FIND-
ING AS TO FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTA-
TION ON EXTRAJUDICIAL UTTERANCES 
AND STATEMENTS. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURIS-
DICTION TO VACATE THE ORDER OF OC-
TOBER 20, 1949, THAT BEING A FINAL, UN-
CONDITIONAL AND VALID ORDER. 
A. The order of October 20 and the statute pursuant to 
which it was made are valid. 
Inasmuch as the trial court did not base its order va-
cating the order of October 20, 1949, on the invalidity of 
the order and the statute pursuant to which it was made, 
it does not seem necessary to discuss that question at length. 
It is to be noted, however, that the invalidity of the stat-
ute was asserted by the District Attorney in his petition 
to vacate the order as one of the grounds thereof, and a 
brief discussion of that question appears appropriate. 
The order of October 20, 1949 was made pursuant to 
the following provisions of Section 105-36-17, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 24, Laws of 1943: 
"* * * Where it appears to the court from 
the report of the probation agent in charge of the 
defendant, or otherwise, that the defendant has 
complied with the conditions of such probation, the 
court may if it be compatible with the public inter-
est either upon motion of the district attorney or of 
its own motion terminate the sentence or set aside 
the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, 
and dismiss the action and discharge the defendant." 
Prior to the enactment of the 1943 amendment the 
courts had no power to dismiss an action and discharge a 
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defendant subsequent to sentence of said defendant solely 
upon grounds of good behaviour and public policy. It seems 
clear that the purpose of the amendment was to allow the 
district courts to finally and completely discharge and 
release a defendant and relinquish jurisdiction over him 
where the conduct of the defendant during his term of 
probation was in compliance with the terms of the proba-
tion and nothing appeared to show that defendant was not 
ready to resume his position in society. Clearly the pro-
vision was intended as a benefit to a deserving defendant 
as a means of rehabilitating him; it certainly was not in-
tended as a means of restraining a defendant's rehabilita-
tion by banishing him from the state. 
The question is raised whether the above quoted amend-
ment violates Article VII, Section 12 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. It is apparent upon a reading of that section that the 
amendment does not violate the constitutional provision. 
Article VII, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides 
as follows: 
"Sec. 12 [Board of pardons. Respites and reprieves.] 
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, 
Justices of the Supreme Court and Attorney-General 
shall constitute a Board of Pardons, a majority of 
whom, including the Governor, upon such conditions, 
and with such limitations and restrictions as they 
deem proper, may remit fines and forfeitures, com-
mute punishments, and grant pardons after convic-
tions, in all cases except treason and impeachments, 
subject to such regulations as may be provided by 
law, relative to the manner of applying for pardons; 
but no fine or forfeiture shall be remitted, and no 
commutation or pardon granted, except after a full 
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hearing before the Board, in open session, after prev-
ious notice of the time and place of such hearing 
has been given. The proceedings and decisions of 
the Board, with the reasons therefor in each case, 
together with the dissent of any member who may 
disagree, shall be reduced to writing, and filed with 
all papers used upon the hearing, in the office of 
the Secretary of State." 
The critical words of Section 12 are "Until otherwise 
provided by law." By this constitutional provision it was 
manifestly intended that the legislature be empowered to 
make subsequent changes and additions with respect to the 
pardoning power and the power to discharge a defendant 
from custody and terminate sentence. When the legisla-
ture made the 1943 amendment it was acting pursuant to 
constitutional authority. Even if this were not the case it 
is submitted that the courts would have the power pursuant 
to legislative enactment to dismiss actions and discharge 
defendants. There is technically a distinction to be drawn 
between the power to pardon and commute sentence and 
the power to dismiss an action and discharge a defendant 
from jurisdiction. The latter has always been a judicial 
power. The following authorities establish that such power 
may be validly vested in the courts : 
15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Section 449; 
Annotation, 26 A. L. R., 400. 
The record clearly shows that the court followed the 
statute in considering and making its order of October 20, 
1949. The requirements of Section 105-36-17 as to a fav-
orable probation report were met. The report of the pro-
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bation officer affirmatively stated that defendant had com-
plied with the conditions of his probation and had conducted 
himself in a lawful and creditable manner and that the 
probation office would support the action taken by the 
court. The trial court's order was based upon findings that 
defendant had complied with the conditions of his proba-
tion and dismissal of defendant and discharge of him was 
compatible with the public interest. There is no evidence 
to show that defendant was not, both on October 20, 1949 
and subsequent thereto, deserving of an opportunity to 
resume his position in society within the meaning and 
purpose of said statutory provision. It seems justifiable 
and extremely important, therefore, to emphasize that all 
of the mandatory and substantive requirements and con-
ditions for issuance of the order of October 20, 1949 existed 
and were fulfilled. The order was, therefore, valid. 
B. The order of October 20, 1949 was final and uncondi-
tional and divested the court of the jurisdiction over 
the d~fendant. 
Neither the written order of October 20, 1949, signed 
by the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., nor the minute order 
of the same date imposes as a condition of dismissal and 
discharge that defendant be permanently banished from the 
State of Utah. The charging portion of the October 20th 
written order is found in the last paragraph, which provides 
as follows: 
"It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED 
that the conviction of the defendant, August Schrie-
ber, in the above entitled case be set aside and that 
the said action against said defendant be dismissed 
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and that said defendant be discharged from further 
supervision of the Parole Department of the State of 
Utah." 
The paragraphs prior to the above quoted paragraph of 
the order merely recite that the statutory grounds for is-
suance of the order had been fulfilled and defendant's pur-
pose for seeking the order. 
There can be no question but what the defendant, 
August Schrieber, had intentions of leaving the State of 
Utah for purposes of his health and the health of his son 
and that his intention was to remain away from the State 
of Utah if his health demanded it. It is true, therefore, 
that the defendant's purpose in applying for dismissal of 
the action and discharge from custody was that he might 
leave the state for his health. There is no evidence to show 
that defendant agreed never to return to the State of Utah 
and agreed that that be a part of the order. In order to 
leave the state it was necessary for him to procure author-
ity, and one manner for doing that was by the application 
which he filed with the court. It is a mistake, however, to 
distort and confuse defendant's object in procuring the 
order of dismissal into a mandatory condition of the order. 
Despite the clear and unqualified language of the or-
der of October 20, 1949 and the minute order, the trial 
court vacated the order on the ground that a condition 
thereof, i. e. banishment from the State of Utah perma-
nently, had been violated. The Judge stated that this con-
dition constituted his understanding of the order. The error 
of this result is apparent. It is a stringently enforced rule 
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that parole or extrinsic evidence is not admissible to con-
tradict, impeach, vary or explain judicial records, such 
records importing verity. 
32 C. J. S., Evidence, Section 865; 
20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Section 1164; 
Annotation, 10 A. L. R. 1502; 
Annotation, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 104. 
Under the foregoing principle of law the courts have 
uniformly held that the intention or understanding of a 
court in making an order cannot be proved by parole evi-
dence for the purpose of varying or contradicting or adding 
to the clear and unambiguous language of the written 
order; 
Campbell v. Nunn, 78 Utah 316, 2 P. (2d) 899; 
Northern Assurance Company of London v. 
Grand View Building Association, 183 U. 
S. 308, 22 S. Ct. 133 ; 
Blue Mountain Iron and Steel Company v. Part-
ner, 31 F. 57, (4th Cir.); 
Krause v. Yorke, 89 F. Supp. 91; 
Ex Parte Clark, 60 Cal. App. (2d) 21, 140 P. 
(2d) 92; 
Johnson v. State, 87 Ark. 45, 112 S. W. 143; 
Boyd County v. Ross, 95 Ky. 167, 25 S. W. 8; 
Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235, 40 Am. Dec. 
135; 
Ramis Heat and Power Company v. The City 
of Seattle, 113 Wash. 95, 193 P. 233; 
In re Kehl's Estate, 254 N. W. 639; 
Lipsitz v. First National Bank, 288 S. W. 609; 
Colonial Trust Company v. Hill County, 27 S. 
w. (2d) 144; 
Brandon v. Brandon, 135 S. W. (2d) 929; 
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Brooks v. Miami Bank and Trust Co., 156 
Southern 757; 
Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 Ohio 553, 17 Am. Dec. 609. 
It seems clear from the foregoing authorities that it 
was improper for the trial court to consider matters outside 
the record and written order in determining whether or 
not the order was conditioned upon permanent banishment 
from the State of Utah. The court's ruling was based on 
an oral understanding of the Judge as to the conditions of 
the order. This understanding does not even assume the 
weight and dignity of parole evidence. The Judge's state-
ment as to his own understanding was not subject to any 
of the rights which the law gives to the defendant. It was 
not subject to cross-examination and was not submitted 
to an impartial trial of fact. It is submitted that the trial 
judge's finding based on his own understanding is clearly 
error. The court can readily conceive of the miscarriage of 
justice which would ensue from a practice whereby a judge 
could change the terms of a written order or judgment on 
the basis of his own memory and understanding as to the 
conditions of such order or judgment long after the issuance 
of the same and without availing a party of the opportunity 
to challenge or test the verity of the understanding. 
Certainly if the written order of October 20, 1949, is 
considered on its face it is final and unconditional and 
divested the court of jurisdiction over defendant. It would 
follow on well settled principles that the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to subsequently vacate it and set it aside. 
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A decision which is substantially on all fours with the 
instant case is In re Flint, ... Utah ... , 71 Pac. 531. In 
that case defendant was convicted of the crime of forgery 
on February 25, 1902. The court made an order directing 
that defendant appear March 5, 1902 for sentence. The 
case was continued and March 12, 1902 fixed as the time 
for pronouncing sentence. On March 12 the court made the 
following order : 
"The defendant having been convicted of the 
crime of forgery, and being now before the court 
to receive sentence, and the court being sufficiently 
advised, it is ordered that sentence be, and the same 
is hereby suspended, and the defendant permitted to 
go upon his own recognizance." 
That was in effect an order of dismissal and discharge. 
Thereafter, the District Attorney made a motion for an 
order directing defendant to appear for sentencing. The 
court ordered defendant to appear for sentencing on Jan-
uary 12, 1903. The defendant appeared and objected to 
further proceedings on the ground that the order was final 
and that the court thereby divested itself of jurisdiction. 
The court overruled defendant's objection and sentenced 
defendant to a term of one year in prison and committed 
him to the proper officers. 
Defendant thereupon filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus setting forth the foregoing facts. The Su-
preme Court granted the petition and upon hearing ordered 
that defendant be discharged. The court held that the order 
of March 12, 1902 was in effect an order of dismissal and 
discharge and that once having discharged defendant the 
court could not reassume jurisdiction. The court said: 
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"But we know of no rule or principle of law 
whereby a court can indefinitely suspend sentence, 
keep a defendant in a state of suspense and uncer-
tainty and long after he has been discharged from 
custody have him rearrested and impose a sentence 
of either fine or imprisonment upon him. 
"When the court suspended judgment indefin-
itely, and ordered the defendant discharged from 
custody, it no longer had jurisdiction over him and 
all subsequent proceedings in the premises were un-
authorized by law, and are therefore void." 
C. The condition of banishment which the Judge allegedly 
imposed upon the order of October 20, 1949 was co'Y!r 
trary to law and public policy and void. 
The great weight of authority is that a court does not 
have the power to sentence or order a defendant banished 
permanently from the state. 
People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N. W. 95; 
State v. Baker, 58 S. Car. 111, 36 S. E. 501; 
Haggett v. State, 101 Miss. 269, 57 Southern 
811; 
People v. Lopez, 253 P. 169; 
Ex Parte Scarborough, 173 P. (2d) 825. 
The compelling reasons for the above stated principle 
are obvious. A sentence or order of a court banishing a 
defendant from the state is prohibited by public policy as 
tending to incite dissension among the states, provoke re-
taliation, and disturb the fundamental equality of political 
rights among the states which is the basis of the Union. 
In addition to the foregoing reasons, appellant submits 
that banishment permanently from the State of Utah would, 
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if imposed as a valid condition of the order of October 20, 
1949, impose upon defendant a greater punishment than 
his crime warranted. Although appellant has been unable 
to find any cases, it is submitted that in principle such a 
holding clearly violates the Fifth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States in that it subjects defendant to 
double jeopardy by imposing a new and different sentence 
upon defendant than the one originally ordered. 
There is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law 
of this state which allows or empowers a court to perma-
nently banish a citizen and in doing so increase the severity 
of the punishment prescribed by statute for his crime. 
Therefore, such a condition, if it were in fact a part of the 
order of October 20, 1949, would be invalid and unenforce-
able. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION UPON 
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT VACATED THE 
ORDER OF OCTOBER 20, 1949, IS IMMATER-
IAL AND IRRELEVENT AND DOES NOT CON-
STITUTE GOOD AND SUFFICIENT GROUNDS 
FOR REVOCATION. 
The trial court was required to find and did find, in 
order to grant the order of October 20, 1949, that defendant 
had complied with the conditions of his probation and that 
dismissal of the action and discharge of defendant were 
compatible with the public interest. Those were the sub-
stantive mandatory requirements of the statute for issuance 
of the order. Appellant does not believe that the October 
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20th order could be attacked even with respect to a mater-
ial substantive requirement for issuance of the order, but 
that is a matter which need not be considered here. There 
has not been any fraud, misrepresentation or mistake either 
alleged or proved with respect to any matter, and partic-
ularly with respect to the material substantive require-
ments for issuance of the order. The case seems to repre-
sent the very situation for which the statutory amendment 
of 1943 was adopted. It is appellant's position therefore 
that because the grounds for vacating the order do not go 
to the material and substantive requirements for the is-
suance of the order that they are insufficient to justify 
the trial court's ruling. 
III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS FIND-
ING AS TO FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTA-
TION ON EXTRAJUDICIAL UTTERANCES 
AND STATEMENTS. 
As appears obvious from the record, the court's order 
of vacation and revocation was based on its belief that 
defendant had misrepresented to the court concerning his 
intentions to leave the State of Utah. Whatever the law 
may be with respect to fraud and misrepresentation con-
stituting grounds for revocation of an order it is not nec-
essary to determine that question here. The alleged mis-
representation and fraud were found by the court not on 
the basis of any evidence at the hearing, nor was misrep-
resentation alleged in the petition of the District Attorney 
for the Third Judicial District. To the contrary, the testi-
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mony of the defendant, his wife, and his doctor and his 
attorney clearly indicate that defendant made plans to leave 
and was in extremely poor health and that he did leave 
the state as soon as his health permitted. Certainly, neither 
the trial court nor any other court would or could require 
that a man under the care of a doctor and confined to bed 
prejudice his life by leaving his doctor's care and his sick-
bed and travel several thousand miles. What is the evidence, 
then, upon which the court found that defendant had mis-
represented? This finding was based solely upon the Judge's 
understandings as he had concluded them from the state-
ments of an unidentified public official ; and the Judge did 
not know whether the statements of the unidentified offi-
cial were based on personal observations or information 
acquired from others. Is there any question but what it is 
error for a court to make a finding of misrepresentation 
and fraud on the basis of information received from a 
person who is not named, not sworn and not examined by 
defendant's counsel? The authority is clear that a court 
cannot vacate an order except upon competent evidence 
showing that grounds for vacating it exist. 
Malone v. Topper, 125 Md. 157, 93 A. 897; 
McKee v. Verner, 239 Pa. 69, 86 A. 646; 
People Ex rel. Sweitzer v. Chicago, 363 Ill. 409, 
2 N. E. (2d) 330; 
United States v. Ginik, 2 Black (U. S.) 610, 17 
L. Ed. 352. 
It is submitted that the court's order was not made upon 
competent evidence. 
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A finding of misrepresentation and fraud being the 
basis for the trial court's order of revocation and that find-
ing being based not on competent evidence but upon extra-
judicial statements and understanding, it is submitted that 
the court was in error. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears clear that prior to October 20, 1949, defend-
ant had every right to remain in the State of Utah and 
practice his profession. There was no law or order of the 
court to prevent him from doing so. The only requirement 
imposed on him was that he comply with the conditions of 
his probation, which he did fully and creditably. Defend-
ant wished to leave the state for his health and that of his 
son. To do so the law required that he procure permission. 
He sought the permission in an application made to the 
court. The court by. its written order unconditionally and 
finally discharged defendant and dismissed the action. But 
if the trial court's understanding of the order is imposed 
upon it, the order resulted in restricting defendant's lib-
erties and depriving him of rights he unquestionably had 
before its issuance. It is submitted that the written order 
was final and unconditional, that it was error for the trial 
court to add to it on the basis of an oral understanding of 
the Judge, it was error for the court to find fraud and 
misrepresentation on the basis of incompetent evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT MACFARLANE, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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